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Abstract: Controls on capital inflows have been experiencing a period akin to a renaissance 
since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, with several prominent countries 
choosing to impose controls; e.g., Thailand, Korea, Peru, Indonesia, and Brazil. We focus on 
the case of Brazil, a country that instituted five changes in its capital account regime in 
2008-2011, and ask what the impacts of these policy changes were. Using the Abadie et al. 
(2010) synthetic control methodology, we construct counterfactuals (i.e., Brazil with no 
capital account policy change) for each policy change event. We find no evidence that any 
tightening of controls was effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows, but we 
observe some modest and short-lived success in preventing further declines in inflows when 
the capital controls are relaxed as was done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman 
bankruptcy in 2008 and in January 2011 by the newly inaugurated government of Dilma 
Rousseff. We hypothesize that price-based capital controls’ only perceptible effect are to be 
found in the content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government’s larger 
intentions and sensibilities. Brazil’s left-of-center government was widely perceived as 
ambivalent to markets. An imposition of controls was not perceived as ‘news’ and thus had 
no impact. A willingness to remove controls was perceived, however, as a noteworthy 
indication that the government was not as hostile to the international financial markets as 
many expected it to be.  
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“What was just a trickle of controls before the current crisis is now a flood.”  
(Grabel and Chang, Financial Times, 25/10/2010) 
 
1. Introduction 
Capital controls are a varied lot. While there are many types of controls, one of the 
most basic distinctions is between controls on outflows and inflows. The economics 
literature consistently finds controls on outflows as inefficient and harmful (at least in 
theory – there is not that much distinct empirical research on capital outflows and a careful 
attempt to connect them to fiscal requirements1). Controls on capital inflows, however, 
have been experiencing a period akin to a renaissance since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis in 2008. This renaissance has manifested itself both in empirical and 
theoretical research on the issue, and most importantly in the decision by many countries to 
impose controls; Thailand, Korea, Peru, Indonesia, and Brazil are some of the prominent 
examples. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has advocated the removal of all controls on 
outflows and inflows throughout the 1990s.2 The Asian Crisis of 1997-8, however, initiated a 
slow process of conversion within the IMF that culminated recently with its decision to 
explicitly and openly support the imposition of controls on capital inflows (euphemistically 
naming them ‘capital flow management policies’, and with several caveats and pre-
conditions3).  
The basic premise of this new IMF stance on capital controls is that these should be 
imposed when countries are facing a capital inflow surge and after all other policy 
                                                             
1 Binici et al. (2010) provide a recent empirical attempt to differentiate between the impact of controls on 
outflows and inflows.  
2 The IMF’s campaign to liberalize capital flows culminated in an attempt to insert this issue into its charter – 
see Joyce and Noy (2008) for details and empirical evidence. 
3
 Figure 1 in Ostry et al. (2011) provides a parsimonious summary of these caveats and preconditions.  
alternatives have been exhausted. Here, we are interested in asking the basic questions that 
should be asked, and probably are asked, at the IMF. Are capital controls on inflows, at the 
time of an inflow surge, effective? And if they are, what are their effects? We attempt to 
answer these questions using the Brazilian experience of 2008-2010 in imposing new (price-
based) controls as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) enfolded. The IMF’s position is that 
controls should only be imposed in these kinds of circumstances, rather than as ‘business-
as-usual’ policies; and this position justifies our choice to focus on Brazil’s policy during the 
evolution of the GFC. 
There are five possible impacts of capital controls on inflows: (1) reduce the volume 
of capital inflows; (2) change the composition of inflows (in accordance with the specific 
controls imposed); (3) impact the real exchange rate (preventing an appreciation); (4) 
enable a more independent pursuit of monetary policy (as it relaxes the international 
trilemma’s constraints); and (5) increase/decrease financial stability.4 We are unable to 
directly deal with the second impact (composition of flows) given our data limitations and 
choose not to examine the impact on financial stability since this is a longer-term impact, 
and our focus here is on the short term (three months). We thus focus on the volume of 
capital inflows, on the exchange rate, and on domestic monetary policy (the interest rate). 
There are two recent survey papers on capital controls (Magud, et al., 2011; and 
Ostry et al., 2010). Both conclude that the literature on the impacts of capital controls is 
inconclusive, with some observed effects on the composition of flows, but very little effect 
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 The evidence on financial stability in general, and in particular about the impact of controls on the likelihood 
of financial crises is quite mixed (see, for example, Glick et al., 2006). 
on volumes of flows (and even less agreement on the impact of controls on the exchange 
rate and policy/interest rates).5  
As Magud et al. (2011) bluntly point out, however, this evaluation of capital-controls 
literature suffers from several apples-to-oranges problems. Most relevant to our work are 
two problems: First, the literature mostly ignores the heterogeneity of capital controls 
imposed across countries and over time, and uses cross-country comparisons that utilize 
control indices that hide these distinctions (the ones developed by Miniane, 2004, Chinn 
and Ito, 2006, and Schindler, 2009, are frequently used). Second, the case-studies literature 
focuses mostly on the two poster-children of capital controls, Malaysia (outflows) and Chile 
(inflows).6  
Another distinction that appears important is the distinction between short- and 
long-term impacts of capital account policies. Long-term impacts, while potentially more 
important, are generally more difficult to identify precisely, and this has certainly been the 
case in this literature. Many of the papers that do ‘manage’ to identify some precise impact 
of controls, do so only in the short-term, and fail to find any long-term effects. The IMF, in 
its support for re-considering the use of capital control as a policy, argues that their use 
should be temporary, and their aim is precisely to have a short-term effect on the volume of 
capital inflows. We thus focus here exclusively on the question of the short-term, and ignore 
long-term effects which are probably unidentifiable with our methodology, even if they exist 
at all. 
                                                             
5 We do not provide a significant review of this large literature since these two recent surveys are available. An 
earlier survey of this literature is Edwards (1999). 
6 Malaysia famously imposed temporary controls on capital outflows in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis of 
1997-8, and this act generated a heated debate on the topic. Chile imposed a set of taxes on short-term flows 
in the 1990s that were fairly widely perceived as successful in lengthening the maturity of flows. 
We focus on a set of controls imposed (and relaxed) by Brazil in the last few years, in 
an attempt to control the amount of capital flowing into the country. By focusing on Brazil 
during the Global Financial Crisis we directly examine the IMF’s support for imposition of 
controls in the face of capital inflow surges in a country that has financial markets that are 
largely open to capital flows.  
 We use micro-level data on capital flows from U.S. and European mutual funds 
investing internationally, and a new methodology to estimate the counter-factual (no 
imposition of controls). We use a methodological innovation recently formalized in Abadie, 
Diamond and Hainmueller (2010, henceforth ADH); a paper that investigated tobacco taxes 
in California.  The methodology is based on simulating conditions after an exogenous event 
(in their case, a change in the tax rate, in ours, the imposition or change in the rules 
governing capital inflows). The synthetic counterfactual’s construction is based on the 
relationship to a control group (other U.S. states in the ADH case, other countries, in ours). 
The ADH algorithm does not presume to impose any ad hoc assumptions about the likely 
control group, but rather derives this control group as a weighted average of all non-treated 
country observations (with weights estimated from pre-treatment data). The ADH 
procedure allows us to construct a no-policy-change counterfactual and thus measure in 
detail the impact of the controls themselves. It further does not require us to make many 
structural assumptions that would have been difficult to theoretically justify. 
To be thorough, we need to find a way to examine all five possible impacts. We have 
weekly data on capital inflows from mutual funds and examine the evolution of these 
inflows in the aftermath of imposition of controls. Our data does not allow us to examine 
the impact of controls on other types of flows such as foreign direct investment or bank 
loans, but the flows we examine are large. In addition to examining the impact on equity 
flows, we also look for any impact of the controls on exchange rate. We use the same 
synthetic control methodology (Abadie et al., 2010) in order to develop an alternative 
counter-factual exchange rate without controls. Again, the ADH methodology allows us to 
skirt the difficulty of wedding our analysis to any one exchange-rate-determination model; 
since the literature on the determination of exchange rates is both voluminous and 
contentious. We implement the same methodology for interest rates, but since interest rate 
policy changed very little during this time period in Brazil, our model is not good enough to 
capture accurately a synthetic control with a good fit for the ex ante data. Given that 
limitation, we do not present our results regarding interest rates but rather briefly describe 
them at the end of the next section. We do not examine financial stability since our focus is 
the short-term (three months) rather than the long-term that is at the core of the financial 
stability argument. 
 
2. Capital controls and flows in Brazil – The data details 
The Controls 
Brazil liberalized its capital flow regimes gradually starting from the early 1990s, 
culminating in an almost completely open capital account by the mid-2000s, including a 
flexible exchange rate regime (see Goldfajn and Minella, 2005, and Carvalho and Garcia, 
2008, for details and Baba and Kokenyne, 2011, for an evaluation of this capital account 
regime in the run-up to just before the global financial crisis). After a fairly brief period of no 
taxes on foreign capital transactions, taxes were reintroduced in March 2008 at the rate of 
1.5 percent on fixed-income investments.7 Investments related to equities remained exempt 
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 This tax, known as the IOF (imposto sobre operações financeiras), has been used during the 1990s as well. 
from taxes for a while later.8 The tax was reduced to zero in October 2008 at the peak of the 
global financial crisis, when the exchange rate came under depreciation pressures (as in 
many other big emerging markets). A 2 percent tax on fixed-income and equity inflows was 
reintroduced in October 2009 with further widening its application the next month. The tax 
was later increased to 6 percent in two stages (in October 2010); but then reduced back 
down to 2 percent in January 2011.9 Our dating of these capital account policy changes 
relies on OECD (2011). 
 
The Flows 
The weekly mutual fund flows data we use are from Emerging Portfolio Fund 
Research (EPFR). We calculate the weekly flows to a specific country as the aggregate flows 
channeled specifically to this country (from mutual funds whose focus is country-specific). 
Flows that target a broader regional market including this country, e.g. Latin America, are 
excluded from our calculations and are thus not present in much of the analysis. As 
robustness check, we also calculate the broad regional flows to Latin America, which are the 
sum of all flows channeled to this region, and evaluate its response to Brazilian capital 
control. In a similar manner, we calculate the Total Net Asset under management (TNA) by 
summing up the TNA of all funds targeting the designated country; and obtain the Mutual 
fund return by taking the aggregated return of all funds that specialize in the designated 
country.  
Other than the fund-specific characteristics, we also control for the country’s stock 
and bond market performance as well as its foreign exchange rate fluctuations. Specifically, 
                                                             
8 In May 2008, the tax was extended to cover “simultaneous operations” to prevent circumvention of the 
inflow tax (circumvention which was apparently widespread). 
9
 Tax was also expanded to cover margin calls on derivative positions and foreign borrowing with maturities 
below one year.  
we calculate the weekly stock market return on the major stock market index measured in 
local currency. Weekly bond market return is calculated similarly. Bond index are from JP 
Morgan GBI and EMBI and are measured in local currency. Weekly Return on Foreign 
Exchange rate is calculated as the weekly return of the local currency against USD. 
For every episode of capital control, we study 12 weeks (approximately 1 quarter) before 
and after the control date. We include a country as a possible component of the control 
group if there are no missing observations in either variables described above for the given 
sample period. Generally, only a few small countries drop out of the sample. The final 
control group sample contains 32 to 37 countries depending on the episode.  
One of the ADH algorithm’s advantages is the ability to use this synthetic control 
methodology to estimate unbiased coefficients with relatively few pre-event observations. 
In our case we use 12 weekly observations pre-treatment for the estimation (see details 
below); a similar number to what Abadie et al. (2010) use, and only slightly less than the 
number used in the first paper to use this methodology (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).  
 
3. Methodology 

Y it  is the outcome variable that is evaluated based on the controls’ impact on the 
treated country i, (with i=1 for Brazil and i>1 for all other countries) and time t (for time 
periods t=1,….T0,…,T; where T0=13 is the time of imposition of controls or a change in the 
control’s details) and T=25. In this paper, we examine three outcome variables – three 
variables are potential policy aims, and which may have been affected by the imposition or 
relaxation of capital controls: aggregate capital flows (as measured in our mutual fund 
database), the exchange rate, and the interest rate.  

it
I
Y  is the outcome variable in the presence of the controls and 

it
N
Y  is the outcome 
variable had the controls not been imposed.10  The ADH methodology requires the 
assumption that the event has no effect on the outcome variable before the date of impact 
T0 )( 0TtYY
N
it
I
it  . The observed outcome is defined by 

i tY  i t
N
Y  i t i tD  where 

it  is the 
effect of the capital controls change on the variable of interest 

( i t
I
Y  i t
N
Y )  and 

Dit is the 
binary indicator denoting the event occurrence (

Dit=1 for 0t T  and 
1i  ; and 

Dit=0 
otherwise). The aim is to estimate 

it  for all 0t T for Brazil (i=1). The problem is that for all 
0t T  it is not possible to observe 

1t
N
Y  but only 

1t
I
Y . 
Although there is no way of accurately predicting the country-specific determinants 
of 

Y it , the structure of the emerging market economies is fairly similar and the external 
shocks affecting them were fairly similar as well (except for mean zero iid shocks it ).  In 
this case, 

Y1t can be calculated as the weighted average of the 

Y it  (for 2,...,i J ) 
observations from the other countries; i.e.,  

1t
N
Y   j
j2
J
 j tNY  1t 1tD 1t       (1) 
For pre-impact observations ( 0t T ) this equation can be estimated to obtain the weights 
allocated to the different country observations, 

 j.
11  The following estimation equation is 
used for each variable of interest (capital inflows, exchange rate, interest rate), based only 
the pre-impact observations, to obtain estimates for 

  and 

 j : 
                                                             
10 This description is a modified version of Abadie et al. (2010).  To simplify comparison, we follow their 
notation where I denotes intervention (capital account policy changed) and N denotes non-intervention (policy 
not changed). 
11 The Abadie et al.  (2010) specifications include an additional vector of variables that determine the variable 
of interest but are unaffected by the treatment.  We estimate the model with additional variables that may 
affect capital inflows; more details are available in the previous data section and in the data appendix. 

1t
N
Y    j
j2
J
 j tNY 1t  (2) 
Abadie et al.  (2010) show that under acceptable assumptions, one can estimate 

it  for 
0t T by calculating  
2
ˆ ˆˆ [ ]ˆ
J
NI I N
it it jtit jit
J
Y Y YY  

                 for 0t T   (3) 
where the second term on the right hand side of the equation is calculated using the 
weights (

ˆ j) estimated in equation (1) and the post-treatment observations for the control 
group (the other countries’ observations).   
The estimates of equation (1) are only used for constructing the counterfactual as 
accurately as possible.  Thus, we are not interested in the actual coefficient estimates of 
these regressions as they have no economic significance or otherwise interpretable 
meaning.12  
The usual statistical significance of our reported results, based on regression-based 
standard errors, is not relevant in this case since the uncertainty regarding the estimate of 

ˆ it does not come from uncertainty about the aggregate data.  Uncertainty in comparative 
case studies with synthetic control is derived from uncertainty regarding the ability of the 
post-treatment synthetic control to replicate the counterfactual post-treatment in the 
treated observations.   
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we can use permutation tests to examine the 
statistical significance of our results:  We separately assume that every other country in our 
sample implements a similar (and imaginary) capital control in the same year.  We then 
produce counterfactual synthetic control for each “placebo control.” These synthetic 
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 Results for the weights we obtain are available in appendix B. 
counterfactuals for the placebos are then used to calculate the impact of the placebo capital 
controls ( ˆ it
P ) in every year following its (non)-occurrence with the following formula: 
2
ˆ ˆˆ [ ]ˆ
J
NI I N
it it jtit jit
j
P Y Y YY  

                 for 0t T  and j P  (4) 
Essentially, we investigate whether the 1ˆ t  we estimated for Brazil are statistically different 
from the placebo ˆ
P
it  for i>1. This procedure, of course, should only be applied in the cases 
where our initial estimates of the capital controls’ effects yielded any statistically and/or 
economically significant observed impacts. This is not the case in some of our estimations, 
and we therefore include only the placebo results for episodes in which we find any 
apparent impact of the change in the capital control regime. 
 
4. Results 
Results for Capital Inflows and exchange rate 
We estimate the weights for equation (2) and then graph the actual evolution of capital 
inflows (as recorded in the EPFR data we use) and the synthetic control that assumes no 
change in policy. These figures therefore show the counter-factual evolution of capital flows 
had the changes in capital account policy not occurred. We summarize these results 
chronologically for each change in Brazil’s capital account policies 2008-2011: 
The first act - March 2008 (taxing fixed income only) - is reported in figure 1. We 
observe a decline in flows in the run-up to the placing of controls, but that funds start 
flowing in again (net) about two weeks before the episode; this budding inflow may be the 
impetus for the placing of controls (figure 1A). The placing of controls did not appear to 
have a large influence, a small and temporary slowdown in the inflow episode that resulted 
from the controls. While we observe a continuation of the inflow for the counter-factual 
scenario, Brazil experienced a similar dramatic rise, but with about a month’s delay. We are 
not confident that this delay, however, is a result of the imposed controls since it is also 
present in inflows to other Latin American destinations.13 A similarly very brief deviation 
from the counter-factual can be also observed for the exchange rate (figure 1B). Within 3-4 
weeks, we can longer identify any residual impact of the imposition of controls on the 
exchange rate. 
In figure 2, we report on the second act - October 2008 (removing the fixed-income 
tax during the Lehman aftermath). Inflows were decreasing rapidly throughout the pre-crisis 
period starting in July, 2008 (figure 2A). We observe evidence of a slowdown in the capital 
outflows as a result of this removal of controls in October. The counter-factual Brazil 
(without the relaxation of controls) would have experienced a continuing capital flight. 
LatAm funds, also seem to continue declining during this period, though at a slowing rate, 
which suggests that the removal of the IOF did indeed have the intended effect. In figure 2B 
we present the placebo test for this episode; the evidence only suggests an impact that is 
(weakly) statistically observable as non-coincidental (i.e., the gap between the Brazilian 
flows and the counter-factual is bigger than for the majority of the placebos). The evidence 
regarding the exchange rate is not as robust (figure 2C), but there still does appear to be a 
longer-term impact on the exchange rate than the one we observed in the first episode. 
Even that, however, appear to be a transitory phenomenon. 
Third act - October 2009 (taxing both equity and bonds at 2%): The policy aim was to 
reduce inflows, and that did not seem to work (figure 3A). Brazil continued experiencing 
inflows as did the rest of LatAm (if anything, the inflows for Brazil are rising faster than for 
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 These results for the LatAm funds are not presented in the figures but are available upon request. 
other Latin American funds).14 We find no evidence that the imposition of controls had any 
impact of the exchange rate (figure 3B). 
Fourth act - October 2010 (tax going up to 4% on fixed income): In figure 4A, we 
again observe an ineffective control as increase in the IOF does not interrupt the continuing 
inflow episode (as it did for other LatAm countries; but with a bigger impact for Brazil). In 
both acts Three and Four of 2009 and 2010, the post-control inflow boom episode seem to 
be large and unique (since the actual is significantly larger than the synthetic and unique to 
Brazil relative to LatAm funds). The controls did not manage to stem the volume of these 
inflows, though they may have produced other desirable outcomes (more on that below). In 
the next change in policy, presented in figure 4B, the IOF was further increased to 6% only 
two weeks after the previous increase (October 2010). Again, the further tightening of 
controls appears ineffective in stemming inflows. We do not show the corresponding figures 
for the exchange rate, but the results are similarly non-significant.15 
Fifth act - January 2011 (reducing taxes on equities). In figure 5A, we observe a 
short-run surge in equity investment that is unique to the Brazil funds and may be 
attributable to the reduction in the tax on equities. But this surge reverses quickly; and post-
reversal decline is equivalent to a general decline in funds going to LatAm in the first three 
months of 2011. This conclusion is borne out when examining the placebos graphed in 
figure 5B; again, we surmise that a relaxation of controls did appear to have a very-short-
term, but both statistically and economically meaningful impact on capital flows. In the 
longer-term (three months in our framework) there does not seem to be any significant 
impact. The same findings, a brief deviation from the counter-factual and a reversion back 
                                                             
14 If anything, inflows increased further after the tightening of controls. Since the controls were imposed as a 
capital inflow surge was beginning, it is difficult to speculate whether the controls were somehow a signal that 
encouraged further flows (a possibility that is suggested in the survey data that Forbes et al., 2012 present). 
15
 Results are available upon request from the corresponding author. 
to the pre-change equilibrium can also be found in the estimations of the exchange rate 
(figure 5C). 
 
Summary of Empirical Findings – Capital Controls as a Signal 
To summarize, after controlling for the counter-factual (Brazil with no capital 
account policy change) for each event in which Brazil modified its capital controls during the 
first three years of the Global Financial Crisis, we find no evidence that any tightening of 
controls were effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows into the country. We 
do observe some modest success in preventing further declines in inflows when the capital 
controls are relaxed as was done in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in 
2008 and the associated massive credit contraction worldwide. A similar modest success can 
be attributed to the decision by the Brazilian government to reduce taxes in January 2011.  
Both of these decisions to relax controls were instituted during a capital outflow 
episode, and these successes were more evident in preventing further decreases in capital 
inflows than in any sustained impact on the exchange rate. These results complement 
survey responses described in Forbes et al. (2012). In these surveys of investment managers, 
the overall conclusion Forbes et al. (2012) reach is that investment managers’ reactions to 
fairly limited capital account policy changes in a large open economy like Brazil is very 
muted and remarkably heterogeneous. Given these heterogeneous sentiments it may not 
be a surprise that we find so little impact that can be accounted for by the tightening of the 
capital account regime. 
Why did we find an asymmetric impact? Why is there a significant impact when 
controls were removed? The interviews that were conducted by Forbes et al. (2012) suggest 
that many money managers were more interested in the signal content of the capital 
account policy change rather than in the direct impact of the changes on their tax liability 
and therefore on their bottom lines. Brazil, throughout this period, was controlled by the 
left-of-center Workers’ Party headed by Lula.16 Our hypothesis is that price-based, mild 
capital controls’ only perceptible effect are to be found in the content of the signal they 
broadcast regarding the government’s larger intentions and sensibilities. In Lula’s case, the 
government was widely perceived as ambivalent to markets, and especially to the 
international capital markets. Thus, an imposition of (fairly mild) controls was not perceived 
as ‘news’ and thus had no impact. A willingness to remove controls, however, as happened 
in October 2008 in the middle of the global post-Lehman financial panic and then again in 
January 2011, just after the transition from Lula to Dilma Rousseff’s administration were 
both apparently perceived as noteworthy indications that the government was not as 
hostile to the international financial markets as many expected it to be. The removal of 
controls was thus effective since the presumption was that the government had some 
antipathy to financial markets and foreign investors. This of course, suggests that the same 
policy may have a different impact within a political environment in which the government 
is perceived differently.  
 
Brazil and the BRICS 
The weights we obtained in constructing our synthetic controls (see appendix) have no real 
economic meaning, but do describe the conditional correlation between flows to Brazil and 
flows to the other countries in our (comprehensive) sample. Interestingly, the other BRIC 
countries (Russia, India and China) seem to figure quite prominently as controls (with the 
occasional addition of Mexico, Australia, Indonesia, Taiwan). This is interesting in and of 
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 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Replaced on 1/1/2011 by Dilma Rousseff from the same left-of-center political party. 
 
itself, since Russia and Brazil are large commodity exporters, and India and China's sectoral 
composition of trade is quite different). Investment managers of the funds included in the 
dataset, apparently, seem to treat the BRIC as similar substitutes and capital inflows to them 
appear to be motivated similarly. Capital flows in Brazil are correlated much more closely 
with the other members of the BRIC club rather than with regional neighbors like Argentina 
or Chile, and other large agricultural exporters like Colombia or Thailand. 
Forbes et al. (2012) focus on the externalities created by the imposition of capital 
controls, and how the imposition/relaxation of controls in one country (Brazil) may lead to 
reallocation of portfolio shares that may have an impact on other countries’ capital flows. 
We therefore estimate the impact of Brazil’s five episodes of change in its capital account 
regime on the other BRIC club members, Russia, India and China. In most cases, we do not 
observe any statistically visible deviation between the synthetic and the actual flows – so 
that Brazil’s policy changes had no apparent impact. In a few instances, however, there do 
seem to be notable deviations; in particular we observe that for China in the first episode 
(an inflow surge), Russia in the second episode (outflow), China again in the third episode 
(again an inflow surge), and India and China in the fifth episode (outflow). But these 
deviations fit with our notion that Brazil is attempting to ‘lean-against-the-wind’ while the 
other BRICs are facing the same head- or tail- winds themselves. Unlike Forbes et al. (2012), 
we are hesitant to conclude that this is a sign of an externality; it is equally plausible that 
these changes in controls were implemented when all the BRICs were experiencing very 
similar capital inflow surges or capital flights/retrenchments. 
 
5. Future research 
In an IMF April 2011 meeting discussing the IMF’s guidelines for supporting the use 
of capital controls, the Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega voiced his opposition. He 
declared: "We oppose any guidelines, frameworks or 'codes of conduct' that attempt to 
constrain, directly or indirectly, policy responses of countries facing surges in volatile capital 
inflows. Governments must have flexibility and discretion to adopt policies that they 
consider appropriate." (Reddy, 2011). The Brazilian government, as well as other 
representatives from emerging markets, found the IMF’s limited support of capital controls 
as a prudential policy tool as too limited and constraining, and argued for a broader 
mandate to use this set of tools. 
In what can be perceived as a limited confirmation of this concern, IMF researchers 
recently concluded, in the case of several Eastern European countries that were 
experiencing heavy inflows, that the conditions prevailing in these cases did not justify the 
imposition of controls; and advocated more conventional (and less controversial among 
economists) monetary and fiscal adjustments (Chowdhury and Keller, 2012). If one uses the 
broad framework that the IMF suggests, however, on most accounts Brazil in 2008-10 
appeared to have been a good candidate for the imposition of controls.  
It is remarkable, therefore, that we fail to find much impact of these controls given 
their intended rationale in limiting the volume of capital flowing into a potentially over-
heated economy, and the vocal support these policies have garnered from many corners of 
the policy world. The reasons for instituting these policies, of course, may be political and 
electoral in nature, rather than being truly guided by a desire to obtain any of the impacts 
we described. It may be indeed that policy makers fully understand the inability of these 
controls to make any substantial impact, but nevertheless resort to adopting them. We 
leave that possibility for future work. 
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Figure 1A: 2008-3-12 Taxing fixed income investment – CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
Figure 1B: 2008-3-12 Taxing fixed income investment – EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
  
Figure 2A: 2008-10-23 Cutting fixed income tax – CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
 
Figure 2B: 2008-10-23 Cutting fixed income tax – Placebos 
 
  
Figure 2c: 2008-10-23 Cutting fixed income tax – EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3A: 2009-10-20 Taxing stock and bond investment at 2% - CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
Figure 3B: 2009-10-20 Taxing stock and bond investment at 2% - EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
  
Figure 4A: 2010-10-4 Increasing taxes 2 to 4% 
 
Figure 4B: 2010-10-18 Increasing taxes 4 to 6%  
(and increasing taxes on margins from 0.38 to 6%) 
 
Note: The sample period overlap with the last synthetic analysis. The large gap several 
weeks before the capital control may be attributed to previous control. 
 
 
  
Figure 5A: 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% - CAPITAL FLOWS 
 
 
Figure 5B: 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% - Placebos 
 
  
Figure 5c: 2011-1-3 Reducing taxes from 6% to 2% - EXCHANGE RATE 
 
  
Figure 1A Estimation results  
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 53.084  
cumulative flow on the week end at 2008-2-13 -712.080 -724.852 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2008-3-12 -816.750 -817.039 
Mutual Fund return 6.086 1.972 
log(TNA) 9.464 8.863 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index 1.904 -0.473 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 1.898 1.812 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate 5.704 3.991 
 
 
Figure 2A Estimation results 
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 36.664  
cumulative flow on the week end at 2008-9-24 -370.620 -386.686 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2008-10-8 -557.050 -524.667 
Mutual Fund return -54.740 -42.002 
log(TNA) 9.225 8.689 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index -36.250 -35.266 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 2.084 0.219 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate -21.446 -9.756 
 
Figure 3A Estimation results 
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 101.242 
 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2009-8-5 197.340 199.387 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2009-8-12 265.390 266.513 
Mutual Fund return 26.661 25.029 
log(TNA) 9.609 8.558 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index 18.949 23.702 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 1.358 2.574 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate 8.262 5.382 
 
  
Figure 4A Estimation results 
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 70.546 
 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-8-25 480.330 480.233 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-9-1 587.620 587.774 
Mutual Fund return 10.150 10.112 
log(TNA) 9.921 9.869 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index 7.818 7.779 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 1.632 1.293 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate 3.482 3.825 
 
Figure 4B Estimation results 
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 307.223 
 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-9-25 606.060 874.442 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-10-13 2,074.290 1,536.694 
Mutual Fund return 14.347 11.746 
log(TNA) 9.964 10.615 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index 9.170 10.649 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 1.536 0.365 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate 5.048 1.718 
 
Figure 5 Estimation results 
 Treated Synthetic 
RMSPE 206.968 
 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-11-3 844.590 607.302 
cumulative flow on the week end at 2010-11-29 688.920 851.904 
Mutual Fund return -0.064 3.382 
log(TNA) 10.115 9.082 
Weekly Return on Stock Market Index -1.809 5.026 
Weekly Return on Bond Market Index 1.352 1.873 
Weekly Return on Foreign Exchange Rate -0.657 2.985 
 
 
  
Appendix on Synthetic Weight for Capital Flows to Brazil 
 
2008-3-12: Taxing fixed income investment  
Country Weight 
Australia 0.119 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.051 
China 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
France 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.000 
India 0.000 
Indonesia 0.000 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Philippines 0.000 
Russia 0.000 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
South Korea 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
Taiwan 0.496 
Thailand 0.000 
Turkey 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.326 
United States 0.009 
Vietnam 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
2008-10-23: Cutting fixed income tax. 
 
Country Weight 
Australia 0.000 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.000 
China 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
France 0.000 
Germany 0.000 
Greece 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.000 
India 0.322 
Indonesia 0.000 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.140 
Netherlands 0.000 
New Zealand 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Philippines 0.000 
Portugal 0.000 
Russia 0.244 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
South Korea 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
Taiwan 0.294 
Thailand 0.000 
Turkey 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.000 
United States 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 
 
  
2009-10-20: Taxing stock and bond investment at 2% 
Country Weight 
Australia 0.097 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.000 
China 0.000 
Colombia 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Denmark 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
France 0.000 
Germany 0.000 
Greece 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.000 
India 0.320 
Indonesia 0.126 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 
New Zealand 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Russia 0.456 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
Taiwan 0.000 
Thailand 0.000 
Turkey 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.000 
United States 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 
 
 
  
2010-10-4: Increasing taxes 2 to 4% 
Country Weight 
Australia 0.000 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.000 
China 0.202 
Colombia 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Denmark 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
Finland 0.000 
France 0.032 
Germany 0.312 
Greece 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.120 
India 0.306 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 
New Zealand 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Philippines 0.023 
Poland 0.000 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.000 
United States 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 
  
2010-10-18: Increasing taxes 4 to 6% and increasing taxes on margins from 0.38 to 6% 
Country Weight 
Australia 0.000 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.000 
China 0.903 
Colombia 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Denmark 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
Finland 0.000 
France 0.000 
Germany 0.000 
Greece 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.000 
India 0.097 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 
New Zealand 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Philippines 0.000 
Poland 0.000 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.000 
United States 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 
 
 
  
2011-1-3: Reducing taxes from 6 to 2 % 
Country Weight 
Australia 0.952 
Austria 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Canada 0.000 
Chile 0.000 
China 0.000 
Colombia 0.000 
Czech Republic 0.000 
Denmark 0.000 
Egypt 0.000 
Finland 0.000 
France 0.000 
Germany 0.048 
Greece 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.000 
India 0.000 
Israel 0.000 
Italy 0.000 
Japan 0.000 
Malaysia 0.000 
Mexico 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 
New Zealand 0.000 
Norway 0.000 
Philippines 0.000 
Poland 0.000 
Portugal 0.000 
Russia 0.000 
Singapore 0.000 
South Africa 0.000 
Spain 0.000 
Sweden 0.000 
Switzerland 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.000 
United States 0.000 
Vietnam 0.000 
 
 
